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Abstract 
 
This research novelly explores how Future Time Perspective (FTP) plays a role in reflecting 
on goal failure and striving for future goals.  Participants (N=139) completed questionnaires 
assessing recent goal failure, procrastination, emotion regulation and FTP, then coded as 
either High or Low in FTP.  Results support hypotheses that despite goal failure, those high 
in FTP procrastinated less, planned more and used more cognitive reappraisal strategies. 
Further, procrastination and cognitive reappraisal significantly predicted FTP scores. Thus, 
goal failure may be an essential part of learning how to achieve high self-regulation goals. 
However, it may discourage some from trying again, particularly those low in FTP. Findings 
suggest the FTP may offer a strategy to aid attainment of important high self-regulated, long-
term goals.  
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It is possible to fail in many ways...while to succeed is possible only in one way. 
    Aristotle (384-322 BC) Nicomachean Ethics 
 
Goals are defined as “internal representations of desired states, where states are 
broadly construed as outcomes, events, or processes” (Austin & Vancouver, 1996 p.338).  In 
goal-setting, we develop plans to help motivate and guide our behaviour towards our goal, 
and setting specific plans increases our chances of achieving that goal (e .g. Locke 1968).  If 
success is achieving a goal, then, as Aristotle suggests, there are many ways to fail.  Whilst 
much research investigates goal-setting and goal-achievement (e.g. Austin & Vancouver, 
1996; Locke & Latham, 2002; Pintritch, Conley, & Kempler, 2004), the current research 
explored the non-achievement of goals. 
Goal failure is important to study as it impacts on wellbeing and is likely to influence 
our striving for future goals (Oettingen, 2014).  While there may be many ways to fail to 
achieve our goals, the current research explored two. First, the future goal (to have the future 
I desire) is wanted, but the process of achieving it in the present (what I need to do now) is 
not wanted. For example, I want to be healthy, but I may not want to exercise, stop smoking 
or limit my diet in the present. In the current research, this type of failure is termed the Low 
Future Time Perspective (FTP). People demonstrating this type of FTP want a different future 
to the current present, but it is not strong enough to overcome the present preferences to 
achieve it.  
The second type of failure is where the future goal is wanted, as is the process to 
achieve it in the present, but failure occurs as part of learning how best to achieve the goal. 
For example, those who give up smoking may enjoy being smoke free, yet may go back to 
smoking when stressful situations arise and they are unsure how to cope without a cigarette.  
This will be termed the High FTP as the new future is wanted strongly enough to tolerate (or 
Running Head: FAILING TIME AFTER TIME  4 
 
even enjoy) the process in the present, but the correct skills to obtain such a future are still 
developing. The current research explores these two types of future time perspective to 
examine how they may aid our understanding of goal failure.   
Time Perspective can be defined as the “often non-conscious process whereby the 
continual flows of personal and social experiences are assigned to temporal categories, or 
time frames, that help give order, coherence, and meaning to those events” (Zimbardo & 
Boyd, 1999 p.1271).  Daily actions and decisions are influenced by our past, present and, 
future (Stolarski, Bitner & Zimbardo, 2011) and the way we separate our experiences into 
these temporal zones becomes part of our personality (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). 
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) constructed the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory 
(ZTPI) to assess biases towards one or more time perspectives. As well as ‘past’ perspectives 
(past positive and past negative), there are two ‘present’ perspectives (fatalistic and 
hedonistic) and one ‘future’ perspective.   Hedonists often prefer inconsistency in their lives, 
and live for the moment.  They choose courses of action in life that are pleasurable, 
stimulating and exciting, whilst actively trying to avoid tedious or boring activities 
(Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). Fatalists, on the other hand, believe that nothing that they do will 
make a difference.  A Present Fatalistic TP involves a helpless and hopeless attitude towards 
the future (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Previous research suggests that present-oriented people 
are more likely to engage in risky behaviours such as unsafe sex, drug and alcohol misuse, 
but hedonists tend to have more energy whereas fatalists tend to have less self-esteem and 
more avoidant style coping strategies (e.g. Epel, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 1999; Keough, 
Zimbardo, & Boyd, 1999).  Those more focussed on the future TP actively strive for positive 
future goals and rewards (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2004; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).  They 
usually have higher academic achievement, reduced sensation seeking, and indulge in fewer 
health risk behaviours compared to those low on the future TP (e.g. Shell & Husman, 2001). 
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Most people have a profile on the ZTPI that includes a combination of high and low scores 
rather than a predominance of only one factor.  Thus, depending on the habitual use, people 
may spend a great deal of time planning their futures, living in either a hedonistic or fatalistic 
present, or in a reminiscent or ruminative past.  The current research focuses on the future 
time perspective as it integrates the present (what I need to do now) with the future (to obtain 
what I desire later), which is essential when seeking to achieve goals (and to recover from 
goal failure). 
When a personal goal is chosen, how it will be achieved also needs to be decided (that 
is, the creation of a goal intention).  Concrete goal implementation intentions are detailed 
plans that outline what to do when a certain situation arises, which often promote goal-
striving, lower disengaging procrastination, and allow for further attempts at goal striving 
(see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, for review).  Thus, those who are High in FTP are likely to 
set clear plans based on their intentions as they will want to do what it takes now to achieve a 
better future. However, those Low in FTP do not necessarily want to do anything right now 
so may avoid any detailed planning ‘until later’. 
Further, avoiding some behaviours and focusing on others requires self-regulation 
(that is, the discipline to focus on some preferred behaviours and not others, Bandura, 1986).  
The level of self-regulation required differs with each goal.  Some goals, such as paying the 
bills on time, are undemanding of self-regulation, as they require simple behaviours that are 
executed once or twice in the near future.  Some goals require substantial long-term self-
regulation and include the on-going development of alternative or new behaviours, such as 
finding sustainable ways of exercising when trying to adhere to new diet to lose and maintain 
that weight loss. Such high self-regulation goals also offer many more opportunities to fail as 
they are often long term.  Long-term, high self-regulation goals are often those that are more 
important to us. However, because their achievement is often in the distant future, 
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maintaining focus may be particularly difficult without a clear plan for what needs to be done 
in the present.  Those High in FTP may be more likely to set smaller achievable goals, or sub-
goals if their overall goal is large. This is so that they have something that must be achieved 
in the near future and therefore something that must be done in the present. Those Low in 
FTP may prefer large long-term goals as that gives them more time (that is, they may think 
they do not need to act right now as it would appear to make no difference over the long term 
whether they act now or start tomorrow), which often results in procrastination.    
Procrastination involves delaying acting on our intentions (Lay & Silverman, 1996).  
It often results from inefficient self-regulation (e.g. Baumeister, 1997; Ellis & Kraus, 1997; 
Ferrari, 2001; Ferrari & Diaz-Morales, 2007; Gupta, Hershey, & Gaur, 2012; Harriot & 
Ferrari, 1996; Jackson, Fritch, Nagasaka, & Pope, 2003; Lay, 1990; Sirois & Pychyl, 2013; 
Specter & Ferrari, 2000).  Whilst prior research has explored procrastination as a stable 
personality trait (e.g. Ferrari, 1992; Sadler & Buley, 1999), others view procrastination as a 
result of more context-specific influences (e.g. Lay, 1995; Milgram, Dangour, & Raviv, 
1992). Within Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman & Trope, 1998, Liberman, Trope, & 
Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003) forming a concrete representation of the task 
reduces procrastination (McCrea,
 
Liberman, Trope, & Sherman (2008).  Those with a High 
FTP may be more proactive in their planning of concrete representations of their goal.  
The current research explores procrastination from the future time perspective.  Sirois 
(2014) provides a meta-analytic review exploring procrastination and perceptions of time.  
Results to date are sparse and mixed.  Some results support the notion that procrastination 
involves a negative view of the future (e.g. ‘I will probably fail anyway so why bother now’) 
which is the avoidance of action being taken in the present and is consistent with those Low 
in FTP.  Procrastination can be associated with negative evaluations of the past, a negative 
view of the present (e.g. ‘I cannot do this right now, the time is not right’), and a positive 
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view of the future (e.g. ‘there will be more time tomorrow and I will feel more like doing it 
then’), again, this positive view of the future is consistent with those Low in FTP.  Thus, it is 
not a question of whether the attitude to the future is positive or negative per se but rather 
whether the future inspires action in the present or not. 
Goal failure may either undermine or motivate future goal striving, but what is less 
known is why people have such different reactions to failure (Diener & Dweck, 1978; 
Dweck, 2000).   Attribution theory (Heider, 1958) suggests that we blame ourselves or 
external factors for the failure (see Fiske, & Taylor, 1991).  Further, failure (i.e. the thwarted 
desired goal) is likely to be upsetting.  The higher the emotional salience of the failure, the 
more aversive future striving may become (as there is a risk of further pain with further 
failure). Those Low in FTP are likely to be particularly upset as they were hoping to avoid 
having to do more now to achieve the future goal. However, those High in FTP are unlikely 
to be as upset as they may want to learn from their mistakes and move on to try and succeed 
(as they are focussed on the future where they have achieved their goal).   
One method of ‘learning from our mistakes’ is cognitive reappraisal.  This regulation 
strategy involves a cognitive change, that is, a change in the meaning of the event so that the 
related emotion also changes (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Gross, Richards, 
& John, 2006; Troy, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2013; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012).  For 
example, I might try the cold turkey method to quit smoking. When that fails, rather than 
being upset and continue to smoke, I may try nicotine patches instead. Thus, cognitive 
reappraisal may allow the past failures to be seen as productive learning experiences, which 
may motivate more attempts, envisaging a better chance of success based on what was learnt 
from the previous experience.    
In summary, it was hypothesised that those Low in FTP would be significantly more 
likely to set high self-regulation goals (perceiving more time in the future to achieve them); 
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significantly less likely to formulate a plan to achieve their goals, so they will procrastinate 
more and be more upset at their goal failure and as a result, will be significantly less likely to 
use cognitive reappraisal than those High in FTP.    
 
Method 
Participants 
Online posters were displayed on social networking sites inviting members of the 
public to take part.  One hundred and thirty nine participants were recruited to the online 
survey.   Ninety-eight females and 41 males between the ages of 16 and 63 (M=20.07, 
SD=10.35) took part.  
Materials  
In addition to basic demographic questions (gender and age), a series of questions 
regarding goal failure were developed for participants to complete.   
Goal Failure 
First, participants identified a goal that they had recently tried to achieve but have not 
yet been able to.  Next, they were asked how (or if) they had planned to achieve it.  
Participants were then asked whether they had expected to achieve it.  Next, participants were 
asked how they felt when they did not achieve it using a 4-point likert scale (1=not upset at 
all, 4=extremely upset).  For the final question in this section, participants were asked 
whether they would attempt their goal again. 
Emotion Regulation 
The cognitive reappraisal subset (α=.79) within the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) comprises 6 items. Examples include ‘When I want to 
feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m thinking about’ 
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and ‘When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m 
thinking about’.   Participants use a 7-point likert scale to rate how much they disagree (1) or 
agree (7) with each statement.   
Procrastination 
Lay’s (1986) Procrastination Scale for use with non-student population (α=.88) 
comprises 20 statements.  Example statements include ‘I often find myself performing tasks 
that I had intended to do days before’ and  ‘In preparing for some deadline, I often waste time 
by doing other things’.  For each statement, participants respond using a 5-point likert scale 
(1 = ‘extremely uncharacteristic’ to 5 = ‘extremely characteristic’).  Following reverse 
scoring of some items, a higher score indicates more procrastination. 
Time Perspective 
The future subscale from the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI; Zimbardo 
& Boyd, 1999) was included in the survey (α=.77).  It comprises 13 items, which include ‘I 
am able to resist temptations when I know that there is work to be done’ and ‘I complete 
projects on time by making steady progress’. Each item is rated on a five-point scale (1= 
‘very untrue about me’ to 1 =‘very true about me’).   Following reverse scoring of some 
items, a higher score indicates a higher preference for this TP.   
Procedure 
Participants followed a link displayed on the electronic poster and were provided with 
a unique participant number.  Participants answered the series of questions regarding past 
goal failure. Next, participants completed the cognitive reappraisal items from the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003); Lay’s (1986) Procrastination scale, and 
finally the Future sub-scale items from Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) ZTPI.  An online 
debrief immediately followed.   
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Data Coding 
First, the majority of participant’s goals fell into one of two groups: Low Self-
Regulation or High Self-Regulation. Low Self-Regulation was defined as requiring only a 
short-term effort to achieve the goal and involved only simple behaviours (e.g. pay the bills, 
return a book to the library). High Self-Regulation was defined as requiring long-term effort 
and involved complex behaviours (e.g. quit smoking, lose weight).  Eighty participants 
(57.6%) had failed a high self-regulation goal whereas 55 participants (39.6%) had failed a 
low self-regulation goal, with 4 participants (2.9%) identifying two or more goals requiring 
different self-regulation and subsequently removed from analysis.  
Second, the method the participants described to achieve their goal was coded as no 
plan (goal intention only, e.g. not smoke) (37.4%; n=52), or having a plan (e.g. join a local 
support group and speak with GP about NRT options) (56.8%;  n=79), with 8 participants 
(5.8%) not answering this question.   
Third, when participants were asked whether they had expected to achieve their goal, 
they had either responded ‘yes’ (65.5%, n=91) ‘no’ (15.1%, n=21) or ‘maybe’ (n=21), with 6 
participants (4.3%) not answering this question.   
Fourth, all participants were upset at their goal failure, however, they were split into 
one of two categories, either Upset (a score of 2 or less on the upset scale) or Very Upset (a 
score of 3 or 4 on the upset scale).   
Finally, based on their Future sub-scale score on the ZTPI, participants were coded as 
either Low in Future Time Perspective or High in Future Time Perspective. If participants 
scored less than 3 on the Future subscale they were assigned to the Low Future TP group 
(42.4%; n=59). Those that scored higher than 3 on the Future were assigned to the High 
Future TP group (n=59).  
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Results 
First, a Chi square analysis was performed on the nature of the goals set (High or Low 
self-regulation required). There was no difference between those with a Low FTP setting 
High self-regulation goals (50.0%, n=38) or Low self-regulation goals (50.0%, n=38). Those 
with a High FTP set more Low self-regulation goals (64.7%, n=33) than High self-regulation 
goals (35.3%, n=18), but this was not significant χ2 (1)= 2.677, p=.102 
Second, a 2 (Type of Goal: High vs. Low self-regulation) x 2 (FTP: High vs. Low) 
ANOVA was performed on the procrastination scores. There was a main effect of self-
regulation, with those who set Low self-regulation goals procrastinating significantly less 
(M=54.63, SD=10.63) than those with High self-regulation goals (M=60.77, SD=13.69) 
F(1,116) =5.52, p =.020, d=.50).  There was a significant main effect of the level of future 
time perspective with those High in FTP procrastinating significantly less (M=54.17, 
SD=11.75) than those Low in FTP (M=63.80, SD=12.28), F(1,116) =12.72, p=.001, d=.80). 
However, there was no interaction effect, F(1,116) =1.86, p=.175). 
Third, a 2 (Plan: Yes vs. No) x 2 (FTP: High vs. Low) ANOVA was also performed 
on the procrastination scores. Those who had a plan were significantly less likely to 
procrastinate (M=54.51; SD=10.47) than those with no plan (M=64.57, SD=14.12), F(1,115) 
=14.42, p<.001, d=.80). Further, those in the Low FTP group had significantly higher 
procrastination scores (M=63.80, SD=12.28) compared to those High in FTP (M=54.20; 
SD=11.83), F(1,115) =14.99, p<.001, d=.80).  Although not significant F(1,115) =3.37, 
p=.069), those in the Low FTP group with no plan scored higher procrastination scores 
(M=69.88, SD=12.62) than every other group (those with Low FTP but with a plan 
(M=57.48, SD=8.15); those High in FTP with no plan (M=57.31, SD=13.03) or with a plan 
(M=53.00, SD=11.24). 
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Fourth, a 2 (Upset vs. Very Upset) x 2 (FTP: High vs. Low) ANOVA was performed 
on the cognitive reappraisal scores. Those who were upset (M=20.29, SD=4.47) scored 
significantly higher on cognitive reappraisal scores compared to those who were very upset 
(M=16.67, SD=4.12), F(1,116) =10.15, p=.002, d=.84. Further, those in the High FTP group 
scored significantly higher on cognitive reappraisal (M=20.05, SD=4.49) than those in the 
Low FTP group (M=16.56, SD=4.12), F(1,116) =9.34, p=.003, d=.81.  However, there was 
no significant interaction (F=.358, p=.551).   
Fifth, those with no plan had significantly lower cognitive reappraisal scores 
(M=17.36, SD=4.54) than those with a plan (M=19.34, SD=4.71), t(112)= -2.28, p=.024, 
d=.43. 
Finally, a multiple regression was conducted to predict future time perspective scores 
based on procrastination and cognitive appraisal scores. The model was significant, F (2,110) 
=24.54, p<.001 with R
2
=.309. Future time perspective was predicted by both procrastination 
(β=-.369, p<.001) and cognitive reappraisal (β=.321, p<.001). 
 
Discussion 
The main aim of the present paper was to explore how the Future time perspective is 
involved in reflecting upon our non-achievement of our goals, how it may predict 
procrastination and its involvement in the cognitive reappraisal of unsuccessful attempts, 
which could promote future attempts at our goal.  Results suggest that we often fail to 
achieve those goals that are long term, in part because we set too large a goal and fail to plan 
appropriately and in doing so increase the likelihood that we will procrastinate. In planning, 
we are clearer on what we can do now and what steps we need to take towards achieving our 
goal, thus feeling more in control.  Plans highlight what we must do and what we must avoid 
to increase our chances of success.  Those who do not plan appear to be setting much larger 
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goals that involve higher self-regulation, which should make planning more important.  
However, as the goal is so large it may be more difficult to know where to start, which 
prevents a basic plan being formulated.  Thus, perhaps the problem in the first instance may 
not the lack of planning but that smaller goals should first be formulated.       
Not surprisingly, those who set more long term goals requiring more self-regulation 
procrastinated more compared to those who set short term goals requiring less self-regulation. 
Those low in FTP with no plan did have higher procrastination scores compared to those low 
in FTP with no plan and to those high in FTP with or without a plan. One explanation is that 
those with high FTP are perhaps more realistic about their futures, and do not fool themselves 
into thinking that they can procrastinate and yet still obtain what they desire.  Those with a 
low FTP may have a more negative view of the present and a positive view of the future, 
similar to findings cited by Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) and Sirois (2014), with the future 
used as a means of preventing taking action in the present.   
Upon failing to achieve our goal we can decide whether to try again or give up on the 
goal.  If we are very upset, we may have no interest in attempting our goal again (as an 
interesting finding here is how upset participants were related to how highly they also scored 
on time perspective).  Those who were most upset were low in FTP, whereas those high in 
FTP were less upset. Also, those low in FTP with no plan scored significantly lower on 
cognitive reappraisal. One possible reason may be indicated by the cognitive reappraisal 
results.  That is, those who reported that they were very upset at the goal failure did not make 
use of cognitive reappraisal to the same extent as those in high FTP.  This may have meant 
significantly more rumination and such constant dwelling on a negative past is likely to 
increase distress.  Further, those high in FTP did use cognitive reappraisal strategies and this 
may explain why, by the time they participated in this study and answered the questionnaire, 
they were barely upset at the failure of their goal.  Through cognitive reappraisal, failures 
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may be re-evaluated to reduce their negative impact, thus allowing for further attempts to be 
made and new strategies to be tried and evaluated (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006; Troy, 
Shallcross, & Mauss, 2013).  
In lessening the emotional impact of the failure, future attempts at the goal may be 
made.  Those low in the FTP are less likely to adopt a new plan in attempt to succeed at their 
goals.  Rather, they are failing to draw on previous experience to see the previous plan was 
unsuccessful (thus the plan needs to be adaptive). Indeed, it may be that they are unable to 
see the future success clearly due to being upset at the failed previous attempt, and not 
cognitively reappraising the situation to regulate the negative emotions. On the other hand, 
those high in the FTP may be drawing on this past information to help them put new plans 
into effect for attempting the goal again.  Future research may wish to consider whether those 
high in the FTP are also high in a Past TP, that is, do we need the past to inform our future 
attempts, or is the future alone enough in planning for future success?   
Future research may also wish to consider the important issue of temporal delay.  
Indeed, much has been made of construal level theory of psychological distance and mental 
time travel in temporal research (see Trope & Liberman, 2012, for review).  Those with a 
‘shorter’ future time perspective may not value more distant future goals as much as those 
with a ‘longer’ future time perspective due to the temporal delay.  This makes it more 
difficult to realise the necessity between our present actions and the future consequences, thus 
making procrastination more likely.   An understanding and appreciation of the resources that 
are available to us in the present, and an extended Future TP may increase our chances of 
focussing on the steps towards achieving our goal rather than just on the goal end-state.  This 
may be especially important if the goal requires a longer period of time to complete.  
Typically, people prefer smaller rewards that are more immediate compared to larger but 
more delayed rewards (e.g. Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002).  It is often very 
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hard to stay focussed on a goal if the reward is in a more distant future, thus we should 
perhaps be more aware of how the path towards our goal and the steps required are 
interrelated.  If procrastination occurs when we are unaware of the steps we need to take 
towards goal achievement, then by focussing on the ‘process’ rather than the ‘end state’ may 
give us more of a sense of personal agency in the present when we realise minor yet 
significant progress has been made.  This combined with recognising that each step is itself a 
reward closer to the end-goal reward, may also assist in continuing towards our goal by using 
cognitive reappraisal strategies in time discounting. 
As this study relied heavily on the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI) a 
closer look at this instrument is needed. Since its introduction, the ZTPI has been used 
extensively in time perspective research. The measure demonstrates internal and re-test 
reliability as well as convergent, divergent, discriminant, and predictive validity (e.g. Adams 
& Nettle, 2009; Harber, Zimbardo, & Boyd, 2003; Mackillop, Anderson, Castelda, Mattson, 
& Donovick, 2006; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008).   However, it is important to note that there are 
aspects of time perspectives that are not included and it does have limitations. For example, 
mindfulness is a state of present moment awareness where one is focussed and aware with a 
non-judgemental attitude to what is happening and this is generally considered a highly 
positive present state (Kabat-Zinn, 2004). However, for the ZTPI, the present moment is seen 
more as a ‘pit-stop’ to the future and those that ‘stop’ too long are either overly pleasure 
seeking (hedonistic) or ‘no-hopers’ (fatalists).  Further, the future on the ZTPI is seen only as 
a positive, yet there is extensive research on negative future possible selves where one’s 
future may be more ominous (e.g. Markus & Nurius, 1986; Oyserman, & James, 2009).  
To fully explore why low FTP is so strongly related to procrastination, lack of 
cognitive appraisal and more distress when goals fail, a closer look at the items of the future 
subscale is needed (for example, “When I want to achieve something, I set goals and consider 
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specific means for reaching those goals” or “Meeting tomorrow’s deadlines and doing other 
necessary work comes before tonight’s play.”) demonstrate that these items are not purely 
‘future focussed’. Indeed, they focus very much on the present – specifically, the doing of 
tasks in the present to create a better future. This is important, as those low in FTP were still 
goal focussed (they had set goals, and attempted to achieve them so wanted to focus on the 
future). However, what they appeared not to be doing was attempting to achieve their goals in 
the present (e.g. higher procrastination scores, less planning etc). Indeed, this finding is 
similar to that on fantasy futures versus expected futures, with those who create positive 
fantasies about their future goals failing to take action and those who have positive 
expectancies about their future goals (based on past experience) take action in the present to 
realise their goals (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Thus, the understanding of how your present 
relates to your future is crucial when taking action to achieve a future goal. It is not looking 
to the future alone. Indeed, our results suggest that those who ‘fail’ but are high in FTP (and 
hence also taking action in the present) are likely to view such a failure as a step in the 
learning process to achieving their goal. However, those low in FTP may find their ‘fail’ 
harder to cope with. 
As a possible future intervention, altering the relationship between the future and the 
present may help those who fail at their goals with low FTP. Indeed, mental contrasting is 
one such technique that seeks to connect the work needed in the present to the obtaining of a 
desired goal in the future (see Oettingen, 2014 for a review of this literature). However, 
mental contrasting works best with those who have a high expectation of success. The current 
research did not measure expectation of success (as they had already failed to achieve the 
goal) but with long-term goals, in particular, a high expectation of success might be asking a 
lot.  
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A high expectation of success is highly relevant to the type of goals in this sample of 
general public participants. It is interesting (but perhaps worrying) to note that most of the 
goals that participants in this study had recently failed to achieve were health related.  Our 
health goals may be our most meaningful goals as most of us want to succeed in maintaining 
good health for as long as possible.  Therefore, failure in this area may be more acutely felt 
than failure in other areas (for example, not learning a new skill in doing DIY).  Although we 
cannot achieve every goal we set, perhaps we can increase our goal achievement, particularly 
for those goals that truly matter to us, by making more use of our time perspectives. Thus, 
future research may explore three means by which time perspective may help. First, by 
reducing the time frame (for example, actively using achievable sub goals to achieve long 
term, high self-regulation), the expectation of success might be higher and mental contrasting 
with its stronger connection between the present and the future would work best. Second, by 
changing the time perspective to explore the possibility that the future is now (that is, what 
you do now is creating your future) may also allow participants to explore what they are 
doing now to achieve their goals and to see their future more ‘immediately’. Third, the 
Prospective Brain Hypothesis suggests that what we remember of our episodic past predicts 
what we can imagine in our futures, that is, the episodic past is used to aid the construction of 
our imagined future.  Thus, those with limited access to their past memories (or who have 
never experienced success in this area in the past) may be unable to imagine in much detail a 
realistic future (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). If we base our futures on past 
experience, then past failures may lead us to lack the necessary know-how to appropriately 
plan to achieve certain goals (e.g. lose weight or quit smoking) as we are basing our future 
actions on a failed past. Indeed, health related behavior change usually fails numerous times 
before the successful learning to quit smoking or maintaining weight loss long term (Jeffery 
et al, 2000). Thus, the Prospective Brain Hypothesis would suggest that if we are to re-author 
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those failures and see them more positively as learning steps to success, then we may try one 
of two options. First, seek out alternative past experiences of success (if there are none in this 
area). Second, actively recall, in detail, past episodes of success within the past failure, that 
is, when that the new behaviour was successful (e.g., someone may have quit smoking for 2 
months so how did they do that? What did they do well? When they coped best, what were 
they doing?). Thus, the ‘negative’ past experience of failure can be cognitively reappraised 
into a positive and informative past episode, which could help insure a successful goal 
completion in the future. Further research is needed to explore how helpful that would be. 
Indeed, Time Perspective Therapy involves encouraging people to change the focus of their 
time perspectives, from the negative to the positive, to clear a way to the positive future 
(Zimbardo, Sword, & Sword, 2013).  Although we cannot achieve every goal we set, perhaps 
we can increase our goal achievement, particularly for those goals that truly matter to us, by 
making more use of our time perspectives.  
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